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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL CON- \ 
STRUCnON COMPANY and THE STATE 1 
INSURANCE FUND, / 
Plaintiffs, I ^ ^ 
/ 13230 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF I 
UTAH and GARY LYNN ESKELSON, 1 
Defendants. J 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an original proceeding before the above-
entitled Court for the purpose of having the lawfulness 
of the Industrial Commission's Order and Award of 
August 22, 1972 inquired into and determined pursuant 
to 35-1-83 U.CA. 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION MADE OF THE CASE 
BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
After numerous hearings held before the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Utah, an order dated August 
22, 1972 was entered awarding benefits to the defendant, 
Gary Lynn Eskelson, and finding that there was an 
accident and that subsequent medical treatment was re-
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lated to said accident. A Petition for Review was filed 
pursuant to the Utah Code and the same was denied by 
the Industrial Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek to have the Order of August 22, 1972 
and the award thereunder reversed by this Court. 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
The parties will be referred to in this Brief as they 
were designated in the hearings below in order that the 
same will conform with the transcript of the Industrial 
Commission. That is, the defendant, Gary Lynn Eskelson, 
will be referred to as applicant and the plaintiff, State 
Insurance Fund, will be referred to as defendant and 
insurance carrier. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An application for the adjudication of his claim was 
filed by the applicant, Gary Lynn Eskelson, before the 
Industrial Commission of Utah and received by said Com-
mission on the 24th day of December, 1970. The applica-
tion alleged that the applicant sustained an injury by acci-
dent in the month of October, 1970. This application, 
which was signed by the applicant and his attorney, stated 
that the accident occured when the applicant "injured back 
in everyday work". (R3). The other documents required 
by law to be filed showed the date of injury to be Novem-
2 
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ber 5, 1970. (See Surgical Report filed by the treating 
physician {Rl} and Employers First Report of Injury 
{R2}.). 
A hearing was had on September 2, 1971. (R85). 
After the application was read into the record, setting 
forth the date of accident occurring on the "— day of 
October, 1970" (R86) the applicant was called to testify. 
(R87). His counsel asked the following questions and he 
responded as follows: 
"Q. Now, during the course of this employment, 
did you sustain an injury of some type? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What was that, and when did it happen? 
A. I believe the day was November the 5 th, when 
I reported the accident. That's what it shows on 
the record, I think. I was in my everyday routine, 
and about midmorning I noticed that my back 
was quite sore. And I didn't want to say anything, 
so I worked through the day. And I quit about a 
half-hour early that day, and I went and talked 
to my boss. He asked me what was the matter, and 
I told him I had hurt my back. And at that time I 
couldn't hardly straighten up, and I had a hard 
time breathing. And he told me that I had better 
go see a doctor. That he himself had a bad back, 
and he knew what it was like. And he said: 'I don't 
want to see' —" (R88 and 89). 
The applicant testified that after he had changed 
doctors, (R90) he was subsequently admitted to the 
Cottonwood Hospital and surgery was performed. (R90). 
3 
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On cross-ekamination, inquiry was made as to 
whether or not the injury occurred in October or Novem-
ber. The applicant readily admitted that he understood 
the nature of the processing of an industrial claim (since 
he had claimed benefits concerning a back injury which 
had occurred prior to this time) and knew that it was 
necessary that there be a proper reporting of the date of 
injury. (R94). He then reaffirmed the fact that the appli-
cation showing that the injury had happened in October 
was in error and that the same occurred on November 5, 
1972. 
The State Insurance Fund moved for admission of 
Exhibit " D - l " (R96) and this Exhibit is part of the record. 
(R120). This Exhibit was a signed statement by the appli-
cant made prior to the hearing showing the date of injury 
to be October 30th. The applicant explained away this 
inconsistency by saying that his wife had filled out the 
Exhibit in question. 
The testimony at the hearing was not only confusing 
as to the date of injury, but more particularly, was hazy 
as to what activities on the job prompted the injury to 
his back. The application and the initial statement of the 
applicant was that nothing unusual occurred when the 
injury happened and the applicant was "just doing his 
everyday routine" when he felt pain. (R88). In fact, on 
cross-examination the following question was submitted 
to the applicant: 
"Q. And it was just when you were doing your 
normal duties? 
A. Yes, it is." (R95). 
4 
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The applicant admitted (R10Q) that he did not re-
call falling and in regards to whether or not any specific 
incident occurred, he answered as follows: 
"Q- Well, do you remember any specific incident 
that prompted pain to your back? 
A. Just being a carpenter. (R101). 
A. It is just like having a sore leg. One day you 
feel good and the next you don't." (R102). 
On direct inquiry by counsel, the applicant was un-
able to relate pain or his injury to any specific incident 
of his work activity and specifically denied falling or 
twisting his body in an unusual manner. (R116 and 117). 
The record is clear that the applicant, prior to either 
October or November of 1970, had back difficulties and, 
in fact, the applicant admitted that, he had knowledge 
that he had a bad back. He testified as follows: 
"Q. All right. Now the fact of the matter is that 
you claimed to the doctors that your back never did 
cure from this incident that you had with the 
Wycoff Company; isn't that correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And the fact of the matter is that you told the 
doctors, when you went to the hospital, that you 
had missed some 15 months of work prior to this 
incident that occurred either in October or Novem-
ber of 1970; isn't that correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You knew that you had a bad back, didn't you? 
A. Yes." (R102). 
5 , 
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The transcript of the prior hearing, alleging an injury 
in 1968, was made part of the file in question. (R165). 
The industrial claim of the accident in 1968 is not only 
important to note that the applicant had a pre-existing 
back condition but to show that the haziness as to time of 
a specific incident also occurred in the hearing had on 
October 14, 1968. The similarity between the applicant's 
"confusion" claimed in the present case and in the case 
against Wycoff is striking. For example, in the application 
in that case there is no specific date alleged.1 
The applicant admitted in that case that he had not 
fallen or twisted himself in an unusual manner (W21-22) 
and that the pain just came on gradually. Counsel for the 
insurance carrier, at that time, pointed out the discrepancy 
of the date of the accident (R23 and 24) as that reported 
by him and the applicant amazingly explained away the 
basis of this inconsistency by stating that his wife had 
filled out the appropriate documents. (R24). 
As stated earlier herein, after the applicant changed 
doctors, he was hospitalized and surgery was performed 
by Dr. Johnson. In order to delineate the medical questions 
as to whether or not the job activities prompted the need 
for hospitalization, surgery and the resulting disability, 
this matter was sent to a medical panel pursuant to 35-1-77 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended. The panel was specifically 
asked to comment on what was found during the operative 
procedure for the suspected herniated disc that prompted 
1The record of the prior industrial claim was not indexed 
concurrendy with the record in this case. For that reason this 
file will be referred to as "W". 
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the operation was found not to be the etiology of the 
back at the operation. The medical panel found and there 
was no evidence to refute the same, that even assuming 
that an accident occurred "the findings of the operation 
by Dr. Johnson cannot be reasonably contributed to the 
events of November 5, 1970 described by the applicant". 
(R130). The panel also found that the defect in the appli-
cant's condition was a congenital condition rather than a 
problem brought about by trauma or strain. In this con-
nection, the doctors found as follows: 
"5. The panel was asked to comment on the'usual 
causes of compression of the lamina or fracture of 
bone fragments such as found in this case and 
whether or not such findings are consistent with 
the history given by the applicant herein'. It is 
the panel's experience and believed to be the ex-
perience of most orthopedic surgeons that the 
fragmented articular facet that is described by 
Doctor Johnson is usually congenital or develop-
mental in etiology. It is possible that it could be 
caused by trauma, but it would be very unlikely 
for it to be caused by the episodes described by the 
applicant. 
The sharp sacral angle referred to by Doctor 
Johnson in the panel's opinion is nothing more 
than an acute lumbosacral angle that goes along 
with chronic lumbosacral strain, and is the most 
likely diagnosis of the applicant's problem." 
Notwithstanding the fact that the medical panel 
found that the condition of the applicant's pain was not 
related to work activities and was rather related to a con-
genital condition (R157) the Industrial Commission 
entered an award for the applicant. This conclusion was 
objected to bj^  the defendant (Rl42, 143) and the matter 
7 
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was set down to take the testimony of Dr. Wallace Hess, 
Chairman of the medical panel. (Rl44). The doctor in his 
testimony stated that he felt that Dr. Johnson was justified 
in an exploratory operation because of the continued com-
plaints of the applicant. (R157). However, the defect that 
was discovered was, according to the panel, "a congenital 
anomaly". (R157). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the applicant could 
describe no specific activity that prompted pain, was con-
fused as to date of injury, was just doing his routine work 
and the medical panel found that his defect in his back, 
which was long outstanding, was not related to his work 
activities, the Industrial Commission found for the appli-
cant and awarded benefits to him. 
ARGUMENT 
; THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN 
FINDING THAT THE APPLICANT, GARY 
LYNN ESKELSON, WAS INJURED BY ACCI-
DENT ARISING OUT OF OR IN THE 
COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
The Utah Workmen's Compensation Act requires 
that an injury must be caused "by accident" (35-1-45 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended.) It is respectfully submitted, 
taking the evidence most favorable to applicant, that 
there can be no interpretation of the facts that occurred 
in this particular case which could in any manner justify 
a finding of "an accident". This Court, on many occasions, 
has been called upon to decide whether or not in a par-
8 
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ticular instance the facts justify a conclusion that an 
accident occurred. In many instances this issue has been a 
knotty one particularly in reference to internal failures 
prompted by an unusual exertion or strain. Most of these 
cases involve factual situations where the issue is whether 
or not the overexertion, or for the matter just exertion, 
prompted or aggravated the injury in question. It is not 
the position of the State Insurance Fund in this case to 
quarrel with or in fact to meet the issues presented with 
these fact situations and their results. In this particular 
case the only basis for the applicant to receive Workmen's 
Compensation benefits is the naked fact that he experi-
enced pain in his back when he was on the job site. This 
fact alone does not, we respectfully submit, rise to the 
level of constituting "an accident". 
This Court, as early as 1929, in construing the com-
pensation act and the requirements for the finding of 
"an accident" in Graybar Electric Company, Inc. v. In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, 73 Utah 586, 279 Pacific 
161, held as follows: 
"We decided, therefore, that a strain or over-
exertion may cause accidental injury for which 
compensation will be allowed, where the injury 
happened suddenly, undesignedly and unexpectedly 
at a definite time and place." 
In this particular case, the evidence is uncontroverted, 
that the applicant cannot relate any instance with any 
degree of specificity or definiteness of any activity that was 
unusual, sudden or in any manner out of the ordinary. 
One can only speculate in light of the testimony of the 
date of the alleged injury. In any event, after much prob-
9 
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ing both on direct and cross-examination the applicant's 
story is clear, that is, a "bad" back was worsened after 
the work of the day doing routine and normal activity. 
There was no fall. There was no slipping. There was no 
twisting and there is no evidence of any strain or exertion. 
The purpose of requiring an incident or event that 
has some definiteness is bottomed on sound logic and 
justice. A system that would allow for compensation 
purely on the happenstance that one felt pain on the job 
site would defeat the purposes of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act and would allow a Russian Roulette rule 
of where one felt pain to be the key to recovery. 
As this Court stated in Redman Warehouse Corpora-
Hon vs. Industrial Commission, 22 U2d 398, 544 P2d 283: 
"There is nothing in this record that shows 
any unusual event, or 'accident', if you please, justi-
fying compensability within the nature, intent or 
spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act. To 
conclude otherwise would insure every truck 
driver, every railroad engineer, every airplane 
pilot and a lot of others, against a physiological 
malfunction or physical collapse of any of hundreds 
of human organs, completely unproven as to cause, 
but compensable only by virtue of the happen-
stance that the malfunction, collapse or injury 
occurred while the employee was on the job, and 
not home or elsewhere." 
Another rather recent Utah case in setting forth the 
appropriate considerations to be taken in a fact situation 
where it appeared the condition came on gradually caus-
ing injury is Pintar vs. Industrial Commission, 14 U2d 
276, 382 P2d 414. There the Court sustained the non-
10 
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compensability of an accident where the applicant had 
suffered two injuries to his back prior to the incident 
which required him to discontinue work. Initially, while 
timbering in the mine he felt a sharp pain in his back and 
again reinjured or hurt his back when he was pushed 
against the wall by a drill machine. At a subsequent time, 
he went to work as a "roof driver*' and the work activities 
caused such pain and distress that he was unable to con-
tinue and filed his claim for compensation. The Court 
stated: 
"It is, therefore, a prerequisite to compensa-
tion that his disability be shown to result, not as a 
gradual development because of the nature of his 
work, but from an identifiable accident or accidents 
in the course of his employment/' 
Compensation was denied. 
Again, see Curling vs. Industrial Commission, 16 U2d 
260, 399 P2d 202. The applicant had a hearing impair-
ment that had been developing over the years. The 
evidence shows that at a certain day when he was pound-
ing pipes with an air gun for 20 to 30 minutes he noted 
suddenly that other noises around him dulled. The Court 
stated that an accident did not occur notwithstanding the 
fact that the record supported the proposition that there 
was a single incident for an injury must be of a type that 
"it connotates an unanticipated, unintended occurrence 
different than that experienced in the normal course of 
events". The Court went on to state that if an injury 
occurs from a gradually developing condition, the injury 
cannot be compensated unless, specifically, classified and 
claimed as a occupational disease. (See 35-2-1 et. seq. 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended). 
11 
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Cited earlier was a recent case Redman Warehouse 
Corporation vs. Industrial Commission, supra. This case 
cited both Pintar vs. Industrial Commission, supra, and 
Carling vs. Industrial Commission, supra, in reversing the 
Industrial Commission's award of compensation on the 
grounds, that is a matter of law, the applicant failed to 
sustain his burden of proof in his claim of that "an acci-
dent" occurred. 
The "accident" in Redman causing the back injury 
to the applicant occurred because of the herniation of a 
disc when the truck driver was engaged in his business 
of driving from Salt Lake City to San Francisco. During 
the drive, when he was doing his normal business, his back 
worsened necessitating hospitalization. The Court, ex-
plaining that this was the same type of work he had done 
for eleven years, noted that there was no specific incident. 
The Court stated that there was a 
".. .complete absence of competent proof here 
to support any finding with respect to the cause 
of the rupture saved by guess work . . . the claim-
ant has not made the onus of proving a "accident" 
in the course of his employment that "caused" the 
"injury" of which he complains, which burden 
is his." 
It would appear that in this particular case, the de-
fendant's position is much stronger than the position of 
the defendant in the Redman case for the reason that the 
medical testimony does not relate the job activities to 
the resulting etiology of the back. In Mellen vs. Industrial 
Commission, 19 U2d 373, 431 P2d 798, this Court has 
quoted with approal the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
12! 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Wolf in Purity Biscuit Company vs. Industrial Commis-
sion, 115 Utah 1, 201 P2d 969 which sets forth the quan-
tum of proof that is necessary in cases involving internal 
failure that is claimed to be work related, his opinion in 
part is as follows: 
"From time to time we shall encounter difficulty 
in determining whether the commission acted un-
reasonably or arbitrarily in those doubtful cases 
above mentioned. It is not so much the principles 
laid down in the prevailing opinion as it is the 
nature of the proof with which I am concerned. 
In this type of case we are dealing with situations 
involving death or disability which situations may, 
due to a functional failure, occure by reason of the 
work or may be purely coincidental with it. Where 
the death or disability occurs under such circum-
stances as to present prima facia doubt as whether 
it was caused by exertion incidental to the work, 
or an event which occurred only in the duration 
of the work and in regard to which the work 
furnished no material or efficient concurring or 
cooperating cause, then, before a favorable award 
is made, it should appear by clear and convincing 
evidence that the exertion in pursuance of the 
work was at least an efficient cooperating cause 
of the disability or death. The commission should 
have clear and convincing proof that the exertion 
done as a part of the work, whether ordinary or 
extraordinary, was a factor which materially con-
tributed to or caused the death or disability. Un-
less the commission requires clear and convincing 
proof that the disability was employment con-
nected, that is, materially contributed to by the 
work performed, we may open wide the door to 
compensating nonemployment connected death or 
disabilities which the act was not intended to 
cover". 
13 
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Not only is there no clear and convincing evidence 
here that the work activities caused the disability of the 
applicant, the medical evidence is directly to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission's Order should be over-
turned in this case because the record clearly indicated 
that the only claim for compensation is the mere fact 
that pain was experienced on the job site. To award com-
pensation under these conditions is to ignore the statutory 
requirement of "an accident". 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. MOORE, of 
Rawlings, Roberts & Black 
400 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Residential and Commercial 
Construction Company and 
The State Insurance Fund 
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